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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No.  11-2198 
 ___________ 
 
 
 MICHAEL A. ROMERO, 
                                      Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
GEORGE HAYMAN, Commissioner of New Jersey Department of Correction, 
individually and in his official capacity; LARRY GLOVER, Administrator of Northern 
State Prison, individually and in his official capacity; PAUL MARKS, Chief Director of 
Operations, individually and in his official capacity; SEARGEANT TYSON, individually 
and in his official capacity; SEARGENT PORETTI, individually and in his official 
capacity; INVESTIGATOR DOLCE, Senior Investigation Division, individually and in 
his official capacity; JOHN DOE, Disciplinary Hearing Officer, individually and in his 
official capacity 
 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the District of New Jersey 
 (D.C. Civil No. 2:09-cv-01041) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Katharine S. Hayden 
 ____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 3, 2012 
 
 Before:  AMBRO, FISHER and GARTH, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: July 6, 2012) 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
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PER CURIAM 
 
 Michael Romero, a New Jersey state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma 
pauperis, appeals an order of the United States District Court that sua sponte dismissed 
his civil-rights complaint with prejudice.  We will affirm in part, vacate in part, and 
remand for further proceedings. 
 As we write primarily for the parties, we will but briefly recite the relevant facts.  
Romero complained of conduct from 2007, when he was incarcerated at New Jersey State 
Prison.  He alleged, inter alia, that the defendants denied him due process of law before 
placing him in restrictive custody or on disciplinary status; that the defendants seized and 
tampered with his legal materials, in violation of his right of access to the court; and that 
the defendants retaliated against him for “complaining about [their] actions and 
inactions.”  In a well-reasoned and thorough opinion, the District Court held that Romero 
had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, dismissing the complaint 
with prejudice.  See Romero v. Hayman, No. 09–1041, 2011 WL 1344218, at *10 (D.N.J. 
Apr. 8, 2011).  This appeal followed.
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 We are in full accord with most of the District Court’s opinion.  Romero’s 
complaint is light on facts and appears, at times, to allege injuries for which 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 is an improper legal remedy; for example, he repeatedly claims that the 
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 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, exercising plenary review over the 
District Court’s sua sponte dismissal, accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the 
complaint as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in Romero’s favor.  Capogrosso 
v. Sup. Ct. of N.J., 588 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2009) (per curiam). 
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defendants violated state administrative procedures, but fails to realize that, “by its terms, 
[42 U.S.C.] § 1983 provides a remedy for violations of federal, not state or local, law.”  
McMullen v. Maple Shade Twp., 643 F.3d 96, 99 (3d Cir. 2011).  To the extent that the 
defendants are state employees, a suit against them in their official capacities is barred by 
Eleventh-Amendment immunity.  See Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 
249, 254 (3d Cir. 2010).  Nor has Romero shown actual constitutional liability or 
personal involvement by a majority of the defendants.  Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 
1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988).  Furthermore, “inmates are generally not entitled to 
procedural due process in prison disciplinary hearings because the sanctions resulting 
from those hearings do not usually  affect a protected liberty interest,” Burns v. Pa. Dep’t 
of Corr., 642 F.3d 163, 171 (3d Cir. 2011); nor, for that matter, has Romero pleaded facts 
sufficient to imply that the disciplinary segregation to which he was subjected imposed 
an atypical hardship, see Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 706 (3d Cir. 1997).  Finally, 
Romero did indeed fail to plead actual injury relating to his access-to-the-courts claim, 
Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996), and his First Amendment retaliation claims 
were woefully undeveloped. 
 In dismissing Romero’s complaint, the District Court observed that “[i]t does not 
appear that [Romero] could amend his pleading to cure the defects noted herein.”  
Romero, 2011 WL 1344218, at *10.  We agree that most of Romero’s claims are 
defective in a way that implicates faults of both law and fact, so that amendment would 
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be futile.  However, we are less certain about the futility of amending the First 
Amendment retaliation claim.  To state a claim for retaliation, Romero must plead facts 
showing “(1) constitutionally protected conduct, (2) an adverse action by prison officials 
sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his [constitutional] 
rights, and (3) a causal link between the exercise of his constitutional rights and the 
adverse action taken against him.”  Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(alteration in original; citations and internal quotations omitted).  Actions that are not in 
themselves constitutional torts may become so if substantially motivated by a desire to 
punish an individual for exercising a constitutional right.  Id.  As the District Court 
observed, Romero failed to plead both severity of retaliation and the required causal link, 
but he might nevertheless be able to do so if given an opportunity to amend his 
complaint.  See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002) (pro 
se plaintiff must be permitted to amend his complaint before dismissal unless doing so 
would be inequitable or futile).   
 Accordingly, out of an abundance of caution, we vacate the portion of the District 
Court’s judgment that disposed of Romero’s retaliation claims and remand for re-
pleading of those claims.
2
  We affirm the District Court’s judgment on all other grounds.  
Judge Fisher would have affirmed the entire decision and we note his dissenting vote. 
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 We stress that today’s disposition in no way compels the District Court to allow 
Romero’s amended complaint to proceed should it prove defective under § 1915 or other 
screening statutes.  
